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This article contends that human life has an intrinsic value from the moment 
of its conception based on its potential use to the community. This value to 
the community demands protection from the state. However, there is also a 
need to balance this aim against the legitimate health interests of pregnant 
women. Abortions should be permitted only in circumstances where the 
abortion is necessary to preserve the pregnant woman from any serious 
danger to her physical or mental health. This article shows that the lack of 
uniformity in Australia’s criminal law in the area of abortion plays a part in 
unduly undermining the right to life of unborn children. Accordingly, there 
is a need for effective uniform criminal laws throughout Australia that 
properly protect the right to life of unborn children and are duly sensitive to 
the valid health interests of pregnant women that give rise to circumstances 
justifying abortion. 
I INTRODUCTION 
This article seeks to discover whether or not the criminal law in Australia has 
failed to promote the right to life for unborn children, and if so, how. It will 
also examine closely the lack of uniformity in Australia’s criminal law in the 
area of abortion1 to see if it plays a part in undermining the rights of unborn 
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1 See, eg, Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic) ss 1, 4, 5, which permits abortions to be carried 
out; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 82A, which permits abortions to be carried 
out under prescribed circumstances; Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) ss 224–6, which makes it 
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children. In particular, the article will examine whether there is a need for 
effective uniform criminal laws throughout Australia that properly protect the 
right to life for unborn children and are duly sensitive to the valid health 
interests of pregnant women that give rise to circumstances justifying 
abortion.2 
To examine this subject closely, this article will analyse a number of key 
questions. Firstly, it will look at the question of whether or not unborn 
children have rights, and in particular, the right to life. After all, if we wish to 
advocate effective criminal laws to safeguard unborn children, it must be 
known why they are worth protecting. Secondly, the article will look at 
exceptions that make it permissible for unborn children’s rights to life to give 
way to the essential welfare of pregnant women.3 Thirdly, the article will 
critically examine specific areas of legislation in Australian ‘pro-choice’ 
jurisdictions and ‘pro-life’ jurisdictions. It will also look at how the criminal 
law on abortion has been applied in cases to determine whether or not the 
courts contribute to any failure of Australian law to promote the right to life of 
unborn children. Finally, the article will formulate a legal policy 
recommendation in support of the right to life for unborn children that could 
form the basis of future discussion with a view to law reform across Australia 
in the area of abortion crimes. 
II THE INTRINSIC VALUE OF HUMAN LIFE — WHY IT IS 
WORTH PROTECTING THE LIFE OF AN UNBORN CHILD 
The polarising views of the pro-life and pro-choice camps on the abortion 
debate centre upon whether a human foetus is a child from the moment of 
conception or whether it is simply a collection of cells dependent on, and an 
extension of, a pregnant woman’s body.4 This article does not seek to resolve 
this matter; neither camp has any irrefutable argument to offer the other to 
resolve this ideological conflict.5 What both sides may agree on, perhaps, is 
                                                                                                                    
a criminal offence to procure a miscarriage; Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ss 82–4, which makes it 
a criminal offence to procure a miscarriage.  
2 See Roe v Wade, 410 US 113, 153, 162–5 (1973). 
3 See generally Rebecca Dean, ‘Erosion of Access to Abortion in the United States: Lessons for 
Australia’ (2007) 12(1) Deakin Law Review 123, 127–8. 
4 See Ronald Dworkin, Life’s Dominion (Harper Collins Publishers, 1993) 10. 
5 Ibid 10, 30. 
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that human life has an intrinsic value during any stage of its development6 — 
a value that could justify the protection of a human foetus from conception.7 
A The Intrinsic Value of Human Life — Particularly 
Prenatal Life 
Ronald Dworkin offers an interesting notion of ‘intrinsic value’ in relation to 
human life,8 which is worth discussing briefly — although it is a somewhat 
problematic notion.9 Dworkin describes his notion of intrinsic value by 
contrasting it with the notion of ‘instrumental value’.10 Something is 
instrumentally valuable if it has some use to others — that is, if it can be used 
by others to get what they want or need.11 Dworkin gives the examples of 
money and medicine: they are not more valuable than their respective abilities 
to purchase what people want or to cure people.12 In the context of human 
life, something is instrumentally valuable if it can be used by others to get 
what they want or need.13 That is to say, a person’s life is useful because of 
the many things he or she is able to do for others that enrich their lives (in 
relationships, work, and so forth).14 
Intrinsic value on the other hand is value that is independent of what people 
can make use of to get what they want or need.15 That is to say, something is 
intrinsically valuable irrespective of whether or not people want, need or 
enjoy it.16 This notion of intrinsic value is somewhat problematic because it is 
almost impossible to conceive of anything ‘valuable’ that has no possible use 
to others.    
                                                 
6 Ibid 11, 13. 
7 Ibid 13. 
8 Ibid 71–2. 
9 Nikolai Lazarev, ‘The Intrinsic Value of Human Life: A Critique of Life’s Dominion’ (2005) 
12(1) eLaw Journal: Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law 7, II 
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MurUEJL/2005/7.html>. 
10 Dworkin, above n 4, 71–2. 
11 Ibid 71. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid; Lazarev, above n 9, II. 
15 Dworkin, above n 4, 71; Lazarev, above n 9, II. 
16 Dworkin, above n 4, 71; Lazarev, above n 9, II. 
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What is perhaps a better notion of intrinsic value is one that incorporates the 
idea of human life being valuable based on its usefulness to others.17 This 
notion is pragmatic and simple to apply in a legal context.18 With regard to an 
unborn child, society protects that life because of its assessment of the 
usefulness of that life to the community.19 
The issue with the law is its artificial evaluation of the worth of an unborn 
child based on his or her ‘present condition’; this is a patently flawed method 
of assessing the worth of human life. The law governing abortion attributes 
value to an unborn child based on which trimester he or she has progressed 
to.20 However, an unborn child’s value to society based on his or her potential 
future use — which by its very nature is contingent — is a truer valuation of 
unborn children.21 This can be illustrated by the practical example of people 
investing in shares or property; such investment is not valued by the investor 
on the basis of the investment’s present value, but on the basis of its potential 
future value — a potential that may or may not materialise. Yet the very 
significant potential value of unborn children, which crystallises at the 
moment of conception,22 is largely obscured by the law differentiating the 
value of unborn children during the phases of their development.23 
This article suggests that the intrinsic value of an unborn child arises from the 
moment of conception and this intrinsic value is based on the potential use 
this life has to other human beings. The article also suggests that this notion of 
intrinsic value should form the basis of legal policy on the criminality of 
abortion, and that references in criminal statutes to discrete periods in the 
prenatal stage which attribute different value to the unborn child should be 
removed. In this way, from the moment of conception an unborn child could 
be treasured and offered real protection by the criminal law. This is a far cry 
from the current situation in Australia. A number of jurisdictions still 
differentiate the worth of unborn children based on their gestational ages,24 
                                                 
17 Lazarev, above n 9, IV. 
18 See ibid IV. 
19 See ibid. 
20 Roe v Wade, 410 US 113, 163–5 (1973); Dean, above n 3, 127–8, 157–8; see also Criminal 
Code Act 1983 (NT) s 208B; Medical Services Act 1982 (NT) s 11. 
21 Roe v Wade, 410 US 113, 150, 154, 156, 159, 162 (1973); see generally Dworkin, above n 4, 
13. 
22 Dworkin, above n 4, 12–3; see generally Roe v Wade, 410 US 113, 159, 162 (1973). 
23 Roe v Wade, 410 US 113, 163–5 (1973); Dean, above n 3, 127–8, 157–8; see also Criminal 
Code Act 1983 (NT) s 208B; Medical Services Act 1982 (NT) s 11. 
24 For example, Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) s 208B; Medical Services Act 1982 (NT) s 11; 
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 82A. 
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and this serves to undermine the protection the criminal law offers unborn 
children. This defect in the law can be remediated through a legal policy 
position that recognises the intrinsic value of unborn children from the 
moment of their conception. 
The question now turns to what rights are properly ascribed to an unborn child 
in law. 
B Rights in Law of the Unborn 
What is interesting in a legal sense is that the law throughout the world is not 
uniform in ascribing rights to unborn children. The rights of unborn children 
vary between nations.25 To illustrate this point, it is worth very briefly 
contrasting Australia’s position in this area with that of Ireland and also 
looking at what international law has to say on this subject.  
Ireland has taken a very strong legal stance in the protection of unborn 
children, and this is perhaps due largely to its staunch Catholic culture.26 The 
Irish Constitution confers a right to life and offers legal protection for unborn 
children. Explicitly, the Constitution provides that the ‘State acknowledges 
the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of 
the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its 
laws to defend and vindicate that right’.27 Whilst this constitutional provision 
ostensibly affords the opportunity for women to access abortion — for 
example, in instances where continuing pregnancy may jeopardise the life of 
the mother — the provision is about the unborn child’s right to life and not the 
woman’s right to choice.28 Domestic criminal law in Ireland gives effect to 
the constitutional protection of unborn children29 and it is therefore clear that 
unborn children in Ireland enjoy a right to life.30 
                                                 
25 Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 18 March 1998, 736 (John 
Halden). 
26 Rachael Wright, ‘The Silencing of Women: The Irish Abortion Laws and Religion’ (2005) 
6(3) Journal of International Women’s Studies 64, 67. 
27 Constitution of Ireland (Ireland 1937) art 40.3.3. 
28 See Wright, above n 26, 65–6. 
29 See Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (UK) ss 58–9. 
30 See Constitution of Ireland (Ireland 1937) art 40.3.3. 
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What the example of Ireland shows is that some nations recognise that unborn 
children have a right to life in their prenatal state.31 The stark difference 
between Ireland and Australia is that, under its common law, Australia holds 
that the rights of unborn children do not exist prior to their birth.32 That is to 
say, a child becomes a ‘legal person’— with the ability and entitlement to 
enforce his or her legal rights — only upon being born alive.33 For example, 
in the case of Watt v Rama,34 a plaintiff sued for disability caused by the 
defendant’s careless driving, which resulted in a collision with the car the 
plaintiff’s mother was driving whilst the mother was pregnant with the 
plaintiff.35 The collision caused very serious injuries to the plaintiff’s mother 
and disability to the plaintiff.36 The court established that the defendant had a 
duty of care to pregnant women and the children they were carrying via the 
‘reasonable foreseeability’ test, that the defendant could breach this duty of 
care to an unborn child (via careless driving), and that damage (disability) to 
the child could arise after birth. However, it was only upon her birth that the 
plaintiff’s injuries could be sustained by her as a ‘legal person’ and thus only 
then that she had a cause of action for negligence.37 That is, if an unborn child 
is injured, the child’s cause of action ‘crystallises’ upon the injured child’s 
birth,38 which is to say that the damage only exists when the child is born 
alive in a damaged condition.39 What is significant about this case is that the 
court recognised that a duty of care is afforded to unborn children and thus 
they are worth protecting, even though the court qualified this duty by 
imposing the requirement that the child must be born alive.40 The point 
nevertheless remains that in the case of abortion, the ‘born alive rule’ is of no 
use in supporting the right to life of unborn children. Australia, by comparison 
to Ireland, largely lacks the unequivocal legal protection given by the state to 
unborn children.  
                                                 
31 Ibid. Note that a similar situation exists in the Philippines — see Constitution of the Republic 
of the Philippines 1987, art II, s 12, which provides that the ‘State…shall equally protect the 
life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception’. 
32 Pam Stewart and Anita Stuhmcke, ‘Legal Pragmatism and the Pre-Birth Continuum: An 
Absence of Unifying Principle’ (2007) 15 Journal of Law and Medicine 272, 272. 
33 Ibid; Watt v Rama [1972] VR 353; Paton v British Pregnancy Advisory Service Trustees 
[1979] QB 276, 279. 
34 [1972] VR 353. 
35 Watt v Rama [1972] VR 353. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid; Stewart and Stuhmcke, above n 32, 280. 
39 Stewart and Stuhmcke, above n 32, 280. 
40 Watt v Rama [1972] VR 353; ibid. 
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The significant differences in the rights of unborn children across different 
nations are perhaps symptomatic of the nature of the law. The classification of 
the foetus and its rights is the work of ‘legal fiction’.41 Whilst the law might 
be informed by science, its pronouncements are not scientific.42 In many 
cases, the law departs from science and creates its own conceptions of what 
constitutes a ‘legal person’ in whom rights can be invested.43 The ‘born alive’ 
rule is no exception — in fact, its attractiveness to jurists is perhaps based on 
the simplicity of the rule rather than its scientific accuracy in classifying the 
development of unborn children.44  
The position of international law with regard to the rights of unborn children 
could be inferred from the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) art 6(5), which Australia has ratified.45 The ICCPR provides 
that the ‘[s]entence of death shall not be … carried out on pregnant women’.46 
It is implicit in that statement that unborn children are protected and have a 
right to life, which cannot be violated by any state.47 The significance of this 
is that the ICCPR is a binding treaty for those nations that choose to ratify it48 
‘and must be performed by them in good faith’.49 
However, in Dietrich v The Queen the High Court of Australia observed that 
ratification of the ICCPR ‘has no direct legal effect upon domestic law; the 
rights and obligations’ under the ICCPR do not become Australian law 
‘unless and until specific legislation is passed implementing the provisions’.50 
In other words, the right to life of unborn children does not exist under 
Australian law simply because the Australian executive government has 
                                                 
41 Stewart and Stuhmcke, above n 32, 272. 
42 Tremblay v Daigle [1989] 2 SCR 530, 553. 
43 Stewart and Stuhmcke, above n 32, 278. 
44 Ibid 272. 
45 United Nations Treaty Collection, Databases — Status of Treaties (2010) <http://treaties.un. 
org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=1&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4 
&lang=en#Participants>. 
46 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 
1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976, except for art 41, which entered into 
force on 28 March 1979) art 6(5). 
47 See Stewart and Stuhmcke, above n 32, 274. 
48 Australian Human Rights Commission, Fact Sheet 5: International Bill of Rights (2009) 
<http://www.hreoc.gov.au/education/hr_explained/download/FS5_International.pdf>. 
49 The General Assembly of the United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties1969 (entered into force 27 January 1980) art 26, which provides ‘[e]very treaty in 
force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith’. 
50 Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, [305] (Mason CJ and McHugh J). 
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ratified the ICCPR; rather, domestic legislation must be passed to achieve this 
result.51 
However, treaties may influence the development of the common law. In 
Mabo v Queensland (No 2) the High Court of Australia commented that 
‘international law is a legitimate and important influence on the development 
of the common law, especially when international law declares the existence 
of universal human rights’.52 Thus, we can see treaties operating to give 
courts insight into international community values and standards which the 
courts can use to develop the Australian common law and resolve its inherent 
ambiguities.53 
We are perhaps seeing this played out in the evolution of rights for unborn 
children as a result of biomedical developments.54 Such developments have 
forced a sharp rethink of the ‘born alive’ rule and whether it is still 
maintainable that a prenatal child has no right of its own.55 
Whatever the developments in Australian law with regard to ascribing rights 
to unborn children, they have not been uniform56 and they fall far short of the 
Ireland model.57 Countries such as Ireland have determined that it is worth 
protecting the lives of unborn children and so have enshrined this protection 
in their constitutions and given this protection legal effect in their domestic 
criminal statutes.58 Australia’s position is that a ‘foetus cannot … have a right 
of its own … until it is born and has a separate existence from its mother’.59 
                                                 
51 Ibid. 
52 Mabo v Queensland (No. 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, [42] (Brennan J). 
53 See Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273, 288–9, 304; 
Western Australia v Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 373, 486–7. 
54 Stewart and Stuhmcke, above n 32, 273. 
55 Ibid 295; see, eg, Fertilitescentrum (sic) AB and Luminis Pty Ltd [2004] APO 19 [31], [37], 
where the Commissioner, in interpreting the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 18(2), claimed that 
‘human beings’ included the prenatal child from conception (at [37]) and the Deputy 
Commissioner claimed that ‘there is no agreement about when in the reproductive process a 
human being comes into existence’ (at [31]); see generally, Paton v British Pregnancy 
Advisory Service Trustees [1979] QB 276, 279. 
56 Stewart and Stuhmcke, above n 32, 295. 
57 Watt v Rama [1972] VR 353; Constitution of Ireland (Ireland 1937) art 40.3.3. 
58 Constitution of Ireland (Ireland 1937) art 40.3.3; Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (UK) 
ss 58–9; to demonstrate that Ireland is not alone in its position, see, eg, Constitution of the 
Republic of the Philippines 1987, art II, s 12, which obliges the state to protect unborn 
children from conception; Revised Penal Code of the Philippines (Philippines) art 256, which 
penalises a ‘person who shall intentionally cause an abortion’. 
59 Paton v British Pregnancy Advisory Service Trustees [1979] QB 276, 279; Watt v Rama 
[1972] VR 353. 
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However, there appears to be a shift in this position, catalysed by recent 
developments in biomedical science, which are compelling a re-think of this 
‘born alive’ rule. Such a shift has materialised in certain protections for 
unborn children.60 Nevertheless, the law’s response in this area has been 
reactionary, ad hoc, non-uniform and at this stage somewhat rudimentary61 — 
certainly a far cry from the definite position of Ireland. 
This article concludes that Australia’s law offers a measure of protection to an 
unborn child, but not to the same extent as in other countries such as Ireland. 
Ireland recognises an unborn child’s right to life and has enshrined that right 
in its Constitution and criminal law. It is fair to say that Australia deems it is 
worth protecting the lives of unborn children, but the protections that exist are 
heavily qualified and perhaps undermined by the ‘born alive’ rule.  
III EXCEPTIONS TO THE RIGHT TO LIFE FOR UNBORN 
CHILDREN  
A General Exceptions in Law 
The traditional justification for abortion is necessity.62 That is to say abortion 
is justified in circumstances where it is ‘necessary to preserve the woman 
from a serious danger to her life or her physical or mental health’.63 So the 
protection of unborn children is not without limitations. 
In common law, the principle of necessity as a defence to a crime is justified 
on the basis that, on occasions, following the law may bring on greater harm 
than breaking it.64 The basic elements of the defence are that: the criminal act 
was necessary or at least reasonably believed to have been necessary to avoid 
or prevent death or serious injury; necessity must be an essential element of 
the criminal act; and the criminal act was reasonable and proportionate to the 
harm sought to be avoided.65 
                                                 
60 Stewart and Stuhmcke, above n 32, 273–9, 295. 
61 Ibid 295. 
62 See R v Davidson [1969] VR 667; R v Wald [1971] 3 DCR (NSW) 25; see generally Roe v 
Wade, 410 US 113, 139 (1973). 
63R v Davidson [1969] VR 667. 
64R v Loughnan [1981] VR 433, [448]; Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of 
Criminal Law (Thompson Lawbook Co., 2nd ed, 2005) 327–8. 
65R v Cairns [1999] 2 Crim App Rep 137. 
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At common law the necessity defence was traditionally available for all 
crimes except murder.66 Whilst this article will not debate the issue of whether 
or not abortion is murder, the question of whether the defence of necessity can 
be applied to abortion cases in Australia has been largely answered in the 
affirmative.67 Specifically, the defence of necessity is applicable in 
determining whether or not therapeutic abortion is lawful.68 
The issue with using the necessity principle to justify abortion is that the right 
to life of an unborn child is pitted against the significant health interests of his 
or her mother.69 In such circumstances, society must make its choice on the 
value of each — the mother and unborn child70 — and when it does so, the 
earlier discussion on the intrinsic value of an unborn child is quite useful. It is 
plain that the very significant potential value of an unborn child to other 
human beings71 must give way to the actual value of his or her mother when 
the life of the mother or both is threatened.72 
It is therefore important that any legal policy underpinning the criminalisation 
of abortion incorporates the law of necessity. Where the mother’s life or her 
physical or mental health is in serious danger, therapeutic abortion is justified 
based on necessity.73 With this position stated, it is useful to examine and 
contrast the current laws in Australia justifying abortion. 
B Specific Exceptions for the Protection of Pregnant 
Women 
The 1969 Victorian case of R v Davidson74 is of particular significance in this 
discussion because it established the legal principle by which abortions 
proscribed under law could be justified. The case concerned a criminal 
prosecution under s 65 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic)75 for a therapeutic 
                                                 
66R v Dudley and Stephens (1884) 14 QBD 27; R v Howe [1987] AC 417. 
67 See R v Davidson [1969] VR 667; R v Wald [1971] 3 DCR (NSW) 25. 
68 R v Davidson [1969] VR 667. 
69 Roe v Wade, 410 US 113, 150 (1973). 
70 See generally Roe v Wade, 410 US 113, 150–2 (1973). 
71 Dworkin, above n 4, 12–3; see generally Roe v Wade, 410 US 113, 159, 162 (1973). 
72 Roe v Wade, 410 US 113, 150 (1973). 
73 R v Davidson [1969] VR 667; R v Wald [1971] 3 DCR (NSW) 25. 
74 [1969] VR 667. 
75 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 65 provided that ‘[w]hosoever with intent to procure the miscarriage 
of any woman whether she is or is not with child unlawfully administers to her or causes to be 
taken by her any poison or other noxious thing, or unlawfully uses any instrument or other 
means with the like intent, shall be guilty of a felony … ’. 
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abortion. In dealing with that case, the Court established the basis on which 
abortions could be carried out without offending the law. The court ruled that 
to determine whether or not a therapeutic abortion is lawful under section 
65:76 
[T]he principle to be applied is the principle of necessity, importing the 
elements of necessity and proportion to the mischief to be prevented and the 
requirement of honest belief on reasonable grounds on the part of the 
accused that his act was necessary.77 
That is, to lawfully terminate a pregnancy, a doctor must reasonably believe 
that such an operation is necessary to ‘preserve the woman from serious 
danger to her life or her physical or mental health’.78 Significantly, the court 
held that the relevant dangers need not be ‘the normal dangers of pregnancy 
and childbirth’, but include other physical and mental factors which could 
jeopardise the woman’s health.79 The significance of this last part of 
Menhennitt J’s ruling is evident when it is contrasted with a tragic case in 
Ireland.  
In 1992, an Irish abortion case captured international attention and aroused 
debate.80 The case concerned a 14 year old rape victim who conceived from 
the rape and was prevented from travelling to the United Kingdom (UK) to 
obtain an abortion.81 The Irish Attorney-General obtained an interim 
injunction in the Irish High Court to prevent the girl from leaving Ireland on 
the grounds that this would protect the unborn child’s right to life.82 However, 
the pregnancy posed a serious risk to the young mother’s life; she was suicidal 
as a result of the pregnancy.83 The controversy surrounding the case centred 
on the competing rights of the unborn child and mother — the unborn child’s 
right to life versus the mother’s right to be rid of the mental stress of the 
pregnancy that was endangering her life.84 Amidst the controversy, the Irish 
Supreme Court eventually lifted the injunction as a result of the efforts of the 
young mother’s family.85 This Irish case stands in stark contrast to the 
                                                 
76 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). 
77 R v Davidson [1969] VR 667 (Menhennitt J). 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. 
80 See generally Wright, above n 26, 67. 
81 Ibid 66. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid 66–7. 
85 Ibid 67. 
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Australian case, and highlights the very sensible balance the court in R v 
Davidson86 achieved when resolving the problem of the competing interests 
of unborn child and mother. If the Irish court had applied the principles set out 
in R v Davidson,87 it can be concluded that the Irish case would have been 
quickly settled in favour of the young mother. An abortion is not a frivolous 
matter — it is an act that should be considered only when necessity dictates, 
and such necessity would have been deemed to have arisen in the 
circumstances of the young Irish rape victim plagued with suicidal tendencies 
due to her pregnancy.  
Whilst Victoria legalised abortion in 2008,88 the R v Davidson89 judgment 
concerning the principle of necessity is nevertheless very persuasive in other 
jurisdictions such as Queensland and New South Wales (NSW) when these 
jurisdictions apply their respective criminal statutes on abortion.90 In the NSW 
case of R v Wald,91 the principle of necessity — as applied to abortion cases 
per R v Davidson92 — was followed and its focus sharpened by Levine DCJ. 
Levine DCJ elaborated on the scope of the test by commenting that: 
[I]t would be for the jury to decide whether there existed in the case of each 
woman any economic, social or medical ground or reason which in their 
view could constitute reasonable grounds upon which an accused could 
honestly and reasonably believe there would result a serious danger to her 
mental or physical health. It may be that an honest belief be held that the 
woman’s mental health, although not then in serious danger, could 
reasonably be expected to be seriously endangered at some time during the 
currency of the pregnancy.93 
The contrast between this decision and the aforementioned Irish case is quite 
stark. In that case, reasoning of the kind used in R v Wald94 would clearly 
                                                 
86 [1969] VR 667. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic) ss 1, 4–5, which repeals the crime of abortion and 
permits abortions to be carried out up to 24 weeks into the pregnancy (and beyond that period 
with the approval of two doctors). 
89 [1969] VR 667. 
90 R v Bayliss and Cullen (1986) 9 Qld Lawyer Reps 8, 30, 45; R v Wald [1971] 3 DCR (NSW) 
25; Heather Douglas, ‘Abortion Reform: A State Crime or a Woman’s Right to Choose?’ 
(2009) 33(2) Criminal Law Journal 74, 76–8. 
91 [1971] 3 DCR (NSW) 25. 
92 [1969] VR 667. 
93 R v Wald [1971] 3 DCR (NSW) 25, 29; see also CES v Superclinics (Australia) Pty Ltd 
(1995) 38 NSWLR 47 (‘Superclinics’), in which members of the NSW Court of Appeal 
endorsed the decision in Wald. 
94 [1971] 3 DCR (NSW) 25. 
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accommodate the wishes of the young mother and her family in view of the 
young mother’s risk of suicide. Yet R v Wald95 still keeps intact the principle 
of necessity when determining the circumstances under which an abortion is 
permissible.96 
This article strongly advocates the use of the principle of necessity as a legal 
‘safety valve’, so that abortions are permitted only under the particular 
conditions stipulated by Menhennitt J and Levine DCJ.97 These conditions 
provide an effective test by which the rights and needs of pregnant women 
can be properly balanced against the right to life of unborn children and 
thereby ensure that abortions take place for serious and not frivolous reasons.  
By way of illustration, to highlight how a treatable minor medical problem 
could be used to justify an abortion, it is worth mentioning a recent Italian 
abortion incident that has attracted pointed criticism. In this incident, a 22 
week old infant was found breathing and left by doctors to die in an Italian 
hospital after a botched abortion operation.98 The child was discovered alive 
some 20 hours after the abortion operation by the hospital chaplain who raised 
the alarm.99 The child died the following day in intensive care.100 The 
poignant fact in this incident is that the first time pregnant mother opted for 
the abortion after discovering the unborn child had a cleft lip and palate — a 
condition that could be effectively treated by surgery.101 The circumstances of 
this tragic incident highlight the need to ensure that the principle of necessity 
is the guiding legal principle in controlling when it is appropriate for an 
abortion to take place; this legal principle will ensure that the intrinsic value 
of unborn children and their right to life are not seriously undermined by 
allowing abortions for trivial reasons.  
                                                 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
97 See R v Davidson [1969] VR 667; ibid. 
98 Simon Caldwell, ‘Baby that Survived Botched Abortion was Rejected for Cleft Lip and 
Palate’, The Telegraph (online), 29 April 2010 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ 
worldnews/europe/italy/7652889/Baby-that-survived-botched-abortion-was-rejected-for-cleft-
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IV CRIMINAL LAW IN AUSTRALIA DEALING WITH 
ABORTION 
A Jurisdictions Promoting Choice for Pregnant 
Women 
There are three Australian jurisdictions that currently promote choice for 
pregnant women with regard to abortion.102 This article will deal with two — 
Victoria and the ACT. These two are sufficient for the purpose of determining 
whether or not the criminal law across Australian jurisdictions on the subject 
of abortion lacks sufficient effective uniformity to properly safeguard unborn 
children.103 Western Australia, the third jurisdiction, was the first to reform 
abortion law in 1998 in favour of a pro-choice position.104 It is perhaps more 
worthwhile, therefore, to look at the two more recent abortion law reforms in 
Victoria and the ACT.105 After all, legislators in these jurisdictions considered 
the Western Australian model in formulating their own reforms.106 
1 Victoria 
Victoria has relatively recently (in 2008) reversed its position on the 
criminality of abortion by replacing its ‘pro-life’ stance with a ‘pro-choice’ 
stance.107 This shift may be in tune with community attitudes,108 but it is a 
                                                 
102 See generally Victorian Law Reform Commission, Law of Abortion, Final Report No 15 
(2008) 16–24. 
103 See, eg, Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) ss 224–6, which prescribes when it is illegal to 
procure a miscarriage; Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic) ss 1, 4-5, which repeals the crime 
of abortion and permits abortions to be carried out up to 24 weeks into the pregnancy (and 
beyond that period with the approval of two doctors); Elizabeth Kennedy, ‘Abortion Laws in 
Australia’ (2007) 9(4) O & G Magazine 36, 36–7. This paper will contend that only one pro-
choice jurisdiction is needed to undermine the fabric of protection for unborn children — see 
generally Kennedy, above n 103, 37. 
104 Mark J Rankin, ‘Contemporary Australian Abortion Law: The Description of a Crime and 
the Negation of a Woman’s Right to Abortion’ (2001) 27(2) Monash University Law Review 
229, 246; Criminal Code Compilation Act 1913 (WA) s 199, which permits an abortion if it is 
performed by a medical practitioner and justified under the Health Act 1911 (WA) s 334, and 
such justification includes where the pregnant woman has given informed consent for the 
abortion and her unborn child is less than 20 weeks old — see Health Act 1911 (WA) ss 
334(3)(a), (7).  
105 These reforms took place in 2008 and 2002 respectively; see Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 
(Vic); Crime (Abolition of Offence of Abortion) Act 2002 (ACT). 
106 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 102, 23–4. 
107 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 12 September 2008, 3792–5 (Gavin 
Jennings) 3792–3; Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 19 August 2008, 
2950–6 (Maxine Morand) 2950–2. 
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shift that subjects the right to life of unborn children to the discretion of their 
mothers.109 This article contends that it is the duty of the Victorian 
government — a duty to protect the voiceless and vulnerable110 — to stand 
firm in the protection of the lives of unborn children in any trimester111 and 
under any circumstances other than the aforementioned exceptions.112 
Prior to the introduction of the Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic), 
Victoria’s criminal law regime adequately promoted the right to life for 
unborn children. Prior to its changes, the Crimes Act113 held that abortion was 
an indictable offence punishable by significant periods of imprisonment.114 
Section 65115 provided: 
Whosoever being a woman with child with intent to procure her own 
miscarriage unlawfully administers to herself any poison … or unlawfully 
uses any instrument … and whosoever with intent to procure the 
miscarriage of any woman … unlawfully administers to her … any poison 
… or unlawfully uses any instrument … shall be guilty of an indictable 
offence.116 
                                                                                                                    
108 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 102, 65. 
109 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 19 August 2008, 2950–6 (Maxine 
Morand) 2952. 
110 Roe v Wade, 410 US 113, 150 (1973) regarding the state’s interest and duty in protecting 
prenatal life. 
111 Dworkin, above n 4, 12–3; see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976, 
except for art 41, which entered into force on 28 March 1979) art 24(1), which provides that 
‘[e]very child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right to such measures of protection as 
are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State’. Whilst 
this provision explicitly applies to postnatal children, it indicates an international willingness 
to protect the rights of the vulnerable, which may extend — at least in the future — to prenatal 
children. Note that Australia is a party to the ICCPR after ratifying it on 13 August 1980; see 
Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, [8] (Mason CJ and McHugh J). 
112 See Part III of this article. 
113 1958 (Vic). 
114 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) ss 10 (which was later repealed by the Abortion Law Reform Act 
2008 (Vic) s 9), 65–6 (both later substituted with new provisions by the Abortion Law Reform 
Act 2008 (Vic) s 11); see also Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 102, 16–8. Note 
that the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 10 will not be discussed in this article because the section 
overlaps with s 65; see Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 102, 18. 
115 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), later substituted by Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic) s 11. 
116 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 65, later replaced by Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic) s 11. 
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The question of what was ‘unlawful’ was not answered in the Act;117 instead, 
the legislation left it to the courts to determine the circumstances that render 
an intentional abortion unlawful, or, conversely, lawful.118 Section 66 
provided that ‘[w]hosover unlawfully supplies … any poison … or any 
instrument … knowing that the same is intended to be unlawfully used … 
with intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman … shall be guilty of an 
indictable offence’.119 Again, what constituted ‘unlawfully’ in this section was 
left for the courts to decide.120 Both of these sections proscribe unlawful 
termination of pregnancy throughout all stages of pregnancy.121 
The question of what constitutes ‘unlawfully’ in the context of sections 65 and 
66122 was discussed above123 in relation to the cases of R v Davidson124 and R 
v Wald.125 Very briefly, in R v Davidson,126 Justice Menhennitt laid down the 
circumstances in which a therapeutic abortion would be deemed lawful and 
such circumstances were based on the principle of necessity.127 In the NSW 
case of R v Wald,128 Levine DCJ elaborated on Menhennitt J’s ruling by 
setting out matters — such as the social and economic circumstances of the 
mother — that a doctor could consider when properly determining whether 
the principle of necessity would apply to justify an abortion.129 Whilst the R v 
Wald130 decision was never binding on Victorian courts, it was nonetheless 
persuasive due to the similarities that existed at the time between the 
Victorian and NSW criminal statutes dealing with abortion.131 
                                                 
117 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). 
118 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 102, 17. 
119 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 66, later replaced by Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic) s 11. 
120 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 102, 17. 
121 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 19 August 2008, 2950–6 (Maxine 
Morand) 2950; ibid 16–7. 
122 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), later replaced per Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic) s 11. 
123 That is, in Part IIIB of this article. 
124 [1969] VR 667. 
125 [1971] 3 DCR (NSW) 25. 
126 [1969] VR 667. 
127 See R v Davidson [1969] VR 667; Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 102, 19. 
128 [1971] 3 DCR (NSW) 25. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid. 
131 That is, prior to the introduction of the Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic); Victorian Law 
Reform Commission, above n 102, 20. 
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Prior to the 2008 amendments, the Crimes Act132 implicitly recognised the 
intrinsic value of human life from the moment of its conception. It did so 
through proscribing abortion during any stage of a pregnancy.133 The Crimes 
Act134 also implicitly recognised the right to life of unborn children — a right 
that was protected through criminal sanction for those intending to injure that 
right.135 Whilst the Crimes Act136 did not directly deal with circumstances 
justifying abortion, the courts drew on the principle of necessity in describing 
such circumstances.137 By all measures, it would seem that the criminal law in 
Victoria prior to its amendment in 2008 had the necessary elements to 
promote the right to life for unborn children. However, in 2008 this legislative 
and case law regime protecting unborn children dissipated with the passing of 
the Abortion Law Reform Act.138 
The Abortion Law Reform Act139 has the effect of subjecting the right to life of 
unborn children to the discretion of their mothers.140 Section 11141 replaces the 
abortion offences under the Crimes Act142 with new provisions. Section 65143 
now provides that it is only illegal for ‘unqualified persons’ to perform an 
abortion.144 Section 65(2)145 explicitly states that a pregnant woman who 
consents to or assists in the carrying out of an abortion on herself by an 
unqualified person is not guilty of an offence under the section.146 Section 
66147 now provides that common law offences concerning abortion are 
abolished.148 Section 4149 provides that a doctor can perform an abortion on a 
                                                 
132 1958 (Vic) ss 65–6, later replaced per Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic) s 11. 
133 See Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 102, 16–7. 
134 1958 (Vic) ss 65–6, later replaced per Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic) s 11. 
135 See Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 102, 16–8. 
136 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) ss 65–6, later replaced per Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic) s 11. 
137 See R v Davidson [1969] VR 667; R v Wald [1971] 3 DCR (NSW) 25. 
138 2008 (Vic). 
139 2008 (Vic). 
140 See Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 12 September 2008, 3792–5 
(Gavin Jennings) 3793. 
141 Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic). 
142 1958 (Vic) ss 65–6. 
143 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). 
144 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 65(1), with s 65(3) specifying that a registered medical practitioner 
is a qualified person, and registered pharmacists and nurses are qualified to administer drugs, 
etc for the purpose of an abortion. 
145 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). 
146 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 65(1). 
147 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). 
148 This paper will briefly discuss the effect of common law on abortion under Part IVB of this 
article — ‘Jurisdictions Promoting Protection for Unborn Children’. 
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woman who is not more than 24 weeks pregnant. All these statutory 
provisions make it possible for a woman not more than 24 weeks pregnant to 
get an abortion for any reason whatsoever, without any regard to the intrinsic 
value of the child she is carrying or the unborn child’s right to life, or any 
concern for the proportionality of her actions, a proportionality that would 
bear on the principle of necessity.150 
Victoria’s shift in 2008 towards supporting the ‘pro-choice’ position by 
legalising abortion was driven by community attitudes calling for women to 
‘have unrestricted access to abortion on demand’151 and for there to be ‘legal 
certainty on the circumstances in which an abortion is legal’.152 
Notwithstanding community values, it is this article’s contention that the 
Victorian government should not have wilted in the face of ‘pro-choice’ 
community sentiments, but should have instead stood firm in its opposition to 
abortions that are undertaken for frivolous reasons. The law as it stands now 
in Victoria renders the life of an unborn child virtually worthless when pitted 
against the wide discretion of the child’s mother.  
Interestingly, public sentiments153 also expressed the view that abortions 
should not be carried out after 20 weeks of pregnancy for non-medical 
reasons, that is, for reasons such as financial or emotional stress.154 This 
demonstrates that the community places significant value on an unborn child 
in an advanced state of development. However, to fix a point in time in which 
a foetus has merited protection by virtue of its supposed development has very 
little scientific basis and represents no more than a legal fiction.155 How can 
one say that a foetus at 19 weeks can be aborted at the mother’s discretion 
whilst a foetus at 20 weeks can be aborted only where necessity arises? Can 
society fix a time when a foetus first makes a detectable movement in the 
womb,156 when a foetus is ‘viable’,157 when a child first speaks, first walks, 
                                                                                                                    
149 Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic). 
150 See Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 12 September 2008, 3792–5 
(Gavin Jennings) 3793. 
151 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 102, 60. 
152 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 12 September 2008, 3792–5 (Gavin 
Jennings) 3793. 
153 As expressed in the Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 102, 58–68. 
154 Ibid 66. 
155 Stewart and Stuhmcke, above n 32, 272; Tremblay v Daigle [1989] 2 SCR 530, 553. 
156 That is, is ‘quick’. See Roe v Wade, 410 US 113, 132 (1973) for a description of 
‘quickening’, which is ‘the first recognisable movement of the foetus in utero’. 
157 That is, when the unborn child is capable of being born alive. See Mark J Rankin, ‘Recent 
Developments in Australian Abortion Law: Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory’ 
(2003) 29(2) Monash University Law Review 316, 331. 
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first progresses out of nappies, or first reads? These are all developmental 
phases that cannot be properly fixed in time.158 So community views that hold 
a foetus to be more valuable (and thus more useful to society) at a particular 
point in time are bound to be contentious;159 the better approach is to 
recognise the intrinsic value of an unborn child from conception160 and apply 
the principle of necessity to govern when abortions are permissible during any 
point of the pregnancy.161 
Unfortunately, the law in Victoria is far from ideal in this regard. Section 5162 
provides that a foetus of more than 24 weeks cannot simply be aborted at the 
private discretion of its mother.163 Instead, a pregnant woman wishing to abort 
her unborn child after 24 weeks of pregnancy is required to have approval 
from two doctors who reasonably believe ‘the abortion is appropriate in all the 
circumstances’.164 In determining what is appropriate in all the circumstances, 
the doctor must have regard to ‘all relevant medical circumstances’165 and ‘the 
woman’s current and future physical, psychological and social 
circumstances’.166 These provisions place limits on a woman’s discretion to 
abort her unborn child during pregnancy167 and they reflect — in the case of 
unborn children of more than 24 weeks — the sentiments expressed in R v 
Davidson168 and R v Wald169 where abortion is justified only by reason of 
necessity.170 The problem with this stance is that it creates an artificial 
distinction between when an unborn child is merely a part of a woman’s body 
and when he or she is of sufficient worth to warrant state protection.171 Such a 
distinction fails to recognise and respect the intrinsic value of an unborn child 
                                                 
158 Child Development Institute, Normal Stages of Human Development (Birth to 5 Years) 
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from conception and to afford him or her the necessary protection he or she 
deserves when in a vulnerable condition throughout the whole prenatal period.  
This article contends that the better approach would have been to apply the 
same protection given to a foetus of more than 24 weeks to a foetus of up to 
24 weeks. The reality is that less than one per cent of abortions take place 
after 20 weeks of pregnancy.172 Therefore, to provide a safeguard akin to the 
principle of necessity for a foetus of more than 24 weeks is of some value, but 
would not prevent the majority of abortions. Over 99 per cent of unborn 
children who are at risk of being aborted will receive no protection from the 
state (that is, Victoria in this case).173 The position in Victoria is quite stark — 
the criminal law currently fails to promote the right to life for unborn children.  
2 Australian Capital Territory 
The Australian Capital Territory (ACT) was the first Australian jurisdiction to 
decriminalise abortion.174 This occurred in 2002 when the ACT instituted the 
most liberal laws in Australia in advancement of the pro-choice agenda.175 
The passing of the Crime (Abolition of Offence of Abortion) Act 2002 (ACT) 
repealed all statutory and common law offences of abortion in the ACT, and 
now abortion is regulated in the ACT in the same manner as any other 
medical procedure.176 
Prior to its decriminalisation, abortion in the ACT was a crime, as it was in 
Victoria, NSW and Queensland.177 Under the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT),178 
abortion was a serious crime with severe penalties.179 Notwithstanding the 
seriousness of the offence of abortion, it was generally held that exceptions 
                                                 
172 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 12 September 2008, 3792–5 (Gavin 
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grounded in the principle of necessity, discussed in R v Davidson180 and R v 
Wald,181 regulated the permissibility of abortions in the ACT.182 
It can be said that the ACT had a very robust legal regime to safeguard the 
lives of unborn children — a regime that permitted abortion only under 
circumstances of necessity where the health of the mother was at serious 
risk.183 This safeguard was further bolstered by the operation of the Health 
Regulation (Maternal Information) Act 1998 (ACT); this Act provided that 
women wishing to access abortion in circumstances of necessity must be 
provided with information regarding foetal development184 and the medical 
risks associated with an abortion.185 The main purpose of the compulsory 
provision of this information was to ensure that a woman’s decision to abort 
her child was carefully considered with particular and implicit regard to the 
impact that the abortion would have on the life growing inside her.186 
However, the Act’s187 provisions also served to delay the process of obtaining 
an abortion.188 Taken together, the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT)189 and the Health 
Regulation (Maternal Information) Act 1998 (ACT) provided a solid 
foundation for the protection of the right to life of unborn children in the 
ACT.  
This solid regime of protection for unborn children was stripped almost bare 
in 2002 when the ACT repealed not only the criminal provisions concerning 
abortion,190 but also the Health Regulation (Maternal Information) Act 1998 
(ACT).191 The only remaining protection for unborn children sets in at the 
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point the foetus attains ‘viability’.192 Under the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) 
section 42, it is an offence to commit ‘child destruction’, which occurs ‘when 
a person unlawfully prevents a child from being born alive’.193 This provision 
is interpreted as applying only to a viable foetus or one that is capable of 
being born alive.194 The definition of ‘unlawful’ is found in R v Wald195 and it 
applies in circumstances where the termination of the viable foetus takes place 
for reasons other than necessity.196 The problem with this ‘protection’ is the 
lack of precision concerning when during the pregnancy it becomes 
operative.197 With ongoing advances in medical technology and practice, the 
point of viability is constantly shifting.198 The collective conclusions of 
parliaments and courts in various Australian jurisdictions on this subject 
indicate that the point of viability ranges between 22 and 28 weeks of 
pregnancy.199 Therefore, uncertainty as to viability coupled with the fact that 
over 99 per cent of abortions take place prior to 20 weeks of pregnancy200 
renders this provision201 virtually useless and therefore leaves the right to life 
of unborn children in the ACT with virtually no protection.  
The situation as it stands in the ACT is such that the lives of unborn children 
are essentially subject to the discretion of their mothers. The law fails to 
recognise the intrinsic value of human life from its conception and fails to 
afford it any proper protection. From the perspective of an unborn child’s 
interests, the ACT in 2002 had taken a quantum leap backwards from a 
position previously supportive of an unborn child’s right to life. Indeed, ‘[t]he 
ACT has lighted the way towards abortion being a right, and … taken a 
crucial step towards … the feminist utopia’.202 Together, Victoria and the 
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ACT represent a ‘gaping hole’ in the protection of an unborn child’s life in 
Australia, an issue that will be discussed later in this article.203 
B Jurisdictions Promoting Protection for Unborn 
Children 
There are five Australian jurisdictions that currently promote an unborn 
child’s right to life.204 The two that this article will focus on are NSW and 
Queensland, for the reason that judicial decisions in these States have tested 
the respective abortion crime provisions.205 The other three jurisdictions are 
the Northern Territory, Tasmania and South Australia.206 
However, before looking at specific jurisdictions, it is worth first looking at 
the position of the common law with regard to abortion. After all, the two pro-
choice jurisdictions discussed earlier — Victoria and the ACT — deemed it 
necessary to ensure that their respective abortion law reform legislation 
specifically repealed common law abortion offences.207 
1 Common Law Protection of Unborn Children 
The common law’s regulation of abortion is somewhat unclear208 due to the 
fact that abortion has been governed by the operation of statutes since as early 
as 1803 in England.209 However, it appears certain that an abortion after 
quickening is a common law offence.210 That is, the termination of a foetus 
from the moment of its first recognisable movement in the womb211 is 
                                                 
203 That is, under Part IVC of this article.  
204 See generally Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 102, 21–4. 
205 Ibid. Note that a number of the cases to be discussed are jury trials and they are limited in 
what they provide in the way of ‘reasons for deciding’. 
206 Ibid 22–4. 
207 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 66, as replaced by Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic) s 11; 
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unlawful under common law.212 However, the termination of a foetus prior to 
quickening appears not to be proscribed under common law.213 
The common law, where it operates, provides a two tiered approach to 
abortion — permitting the abortion of a pre-quickened foetus and proscribing 
the abortion of a quickened foetus.214 Such an approach fails to adequately 
protect the right to life of unborn children, especially given the fact that the 
large majority of abortions take place early in pregnancy before quickening.215 
This approach is also one fraught with uncertainty due to the fact that 
‘quickening’ is an occurrence that cannot be properly fixed to a point in the 
pregnancy period.216 For these reasons, the common law is not an adequate 
safeguard of the right to life of unborn children. 
However, it was England’s first abortion statute in 1803 that first prohibited 
the abortion of a pre-quickened foetus.217 This article will now turn to how 
effectively contemporary Australian statutes safeguard the right to life of 
unborn children. 
2 New South Wales 
In NSW, abortion is ostensibly unlawful.218 That is, whilst the NSW criminal 
law proscribes abortion,219 case law has opened the gate for abortions to occur 
through its liberal interpretation of what circumstances justify an abortion.220 
NSW case law also demonstrates that the notion of a ‘lawful abortion’ is 
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uncertain and ‘open to subjective interpretation’.221 This is an untenable 
situation that seriously undermines the NSW criminal law’s222 ability to 
protect unborn children’s right to life.223 
The Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)224 ostensibly proscribes abortion during any 
stage of pregnancy. Section 82 provides that a pregnant woman who 
‘unlawfully administers to herself any drug … or unlawfully uses any 
instrument … with intent … to procure her miscarriage’ is liable to ten years 
imprisonment. Section 83 provides that any person who ‘unlawfully 
administers to … any woman, whether with child or not, any drug … or 
unlawfully uses any instrument … with intent … to procure her miscarriage’ 
is liable to ten years imprisonment. Section 84 provides that any person who 
‘unlawfully supplies or procures any drug … or any instrument … knowing 
that the same is intended to be unlawfully used with intent to procure the 
miscarriage of any woman’ is liable to five years imprisonment. Whilst these 
provisions appear to safeguard an unborn child’s right to life, the very few 
cases that have come before NSW courts show that the protection of the right 
is far from absolute or certain.225 
The central issue that undermines the NSW criminal law’s absolute protection 
of an unborn child’s life is the definition applied by the courts to what 
constitutes ‘unlawful’ within the abortion provisions of the Crimes Act 1900 
(NSW).226 In R v Wald,227 the Court suitably followed the decision in R v 
Davidson;228 namely, by stating that the word ‘unlawfully’ implies that there 
must be circumstances where abortions are ‘lawful’, and such circumstances 
are grounded in the principle of necessity where the mother’s life or health is 
at serious risk.229 Importantly, R v Wald230 was taken to establish 
unequivocally that the defence of necessity for an offence under section 83231 
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is available only for the medical profession.232 This was to ensure that any 
such abortion must be ‘skilfully performed by qualified medical practitioners 
with the woman’s consent’233 in order to properly safeguard the woman’s 
health, this being the reason why the abortion was carried out in the first 
place.234 Levine DCJ in that case also expanded — in his discussion of the 
principle of necessity235 — the grounds that may be considered to cause a 
serious threat to a pregnant woman’s mental or physical health. He included 
non-medical grounds, that is, grounds based on social and economic 
factors.236 Whilst these are ostensibly non-medical factors, they are considered 
only when they may pose a serious danger to the physical or mental health of 
the pregnant woman.237 However, Levine DCJ limited the period during 
which the serious danger may materialise to ‘the currency of the pregnancy, if 
uninterrupted’.238 Such limitation is clearly problematic239 and will be 
discussed shortly. In summary, whilst the NSW criminal law’s protection of 
an unborn child’s life is by no means absolute, the exceptions are appropriate 
and necessary and do not in any way confer upon women a ‘right to an 
abortion’.240 
Whilst the lack of absolute protection in NSW for unborn children is 
appropriate when guided by the principle of necessity, the uncertainty 
surrounding the principle’s application in NSW is a real and significant issue. 
This uncertainty was brought to light in CES v Superclinics (Australia) Pty 
Ltd (‘Superclinics’),241 which was a NSW civil case, brought on appeal to the 
NSW Supreme Court, and which dealt with a medical negligence matter. The 
case was brought against a number of medical practitioners for failing to 
diagnose the plaintiff’s pregnancy.242 However, before dealing with the issue 
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of uncertainty, it is worth considering what contribution Superclinics243 made 
to the law of abortion in NSW.  
The Supreme Court in Superclinics244 affirmed the rules espoused in R v 
Wald245 regarding the circumstances that make abortion necessary,246 but in 
the process the Court also made a novel ruling that is worth mentioning. In 
considering the decision of R v Wald,247 regarding when abortions are lawful, 
Kirby ACJ was critical of Levine DCJ’s decision to limit to ‘the currency of 
the pregnancy, if uninterrupted’,248 the period in which any serious danger to 
the pregnant woman’s physical or mental health may materialise.249 Kirby 
ACJ held that a medical practitioner should be permitted to consider the 
health risks that the continuing pregnancy poses to a pregnant woman beyond 
the uninterrupted period of the pregnancy alone.250 After all, if one has 
accepted that social and economic circumstances are proper considerations in 
assessing the health implications of a pregnancy for a pregnant woman, it is 
illogical to exclude these considerations after the child is born. This is 
because it is generally then that social and economic factors play their most 
significant part.251 This article accepts that Kirby ACJ’s comments are 
appropriate given the serious risks posed to a woman’s psychological health 
after childbirth;252 the decision is a far cry from allowing abortion on 
demand.253 So, whilst Superclinics254 has allowed post-birth consequences to 
be taken into account in determining the necessity of an abortion, the actual 
decision as to whether or not an abortion is necessary to preserve the mother’s 
health is one to be made by medical practitioners alone.255 This position 
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provides a balanced and appropriate safeguard to the health of pregnant 
women and the lives of unborn children in NSW.256 
Turning now to the problematic matter of uncertainty, Superclinics257 
highlights the uncertainty associated with applying the ‘necessity principle’ to 
abortion cases. Superclinics258 was heard in the first instance by Newman J in 
the NSW Supreme Court and later, on appeal, in the NSW Court of Appeal.259 
The substantive law applied in both instances — that is, in the first instance 
and then on appeal — was identical; both courts considered and applied R v 
Davidson260 and R v Wald.261The issue with the two Superclinics262 decisions 
is that the Court of Appeal decided differently from the court of first instance 
(the NSW Supreme Court) as to whether or not a ‘serious danger’ to the 
woman’s mental health existed at the relevant time due to the pregnancy.263 In 
the first instance the NSW Supreme Court found that an abortion under the 
circumstances would be unlawful, whereas the NSW Court of Appeal found 
that under the very same circumstances an abortion would be lawful.264 This 
brings into sharp focus ‘the uncertain, and therefore unsatisfactory, state of 
the law’ in NSW with regard to whether or not an abortion is lawful due to a 
pregnancy posing a ‘serious danger’ to a mother’s health.265 
More alarmingly, Kirby ACJ of the NSW Court of Appeal acknowledged that 
what constitutes a ‘serious danger’ to the health of a pregnant woman —
thereby justifying an abortion per R v Davidson266 and R v Wald267 — is ‘open 
to subjective interpretation’.268 This lack of certainty undermines what would 
otherwise be quite effective protection under NSW law of the lives of unborn 
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children.269 It is a significant failing because it sends a message to the NSW 
justice and prosecuting agencies that the enforcement of abortion crimes is too 
risky an undertaking to be worthwhile, due to the substantial costs associated 
with such prosecutions and the considerable uncertainty of the outcome.270 
Whilst it is lamentable that the criminal law in NSW has a significant chink in 
its protection of the lives of unborn children, this is something that could be 
addressed with the necessary political will. All that is required is some 
legislative provision detailing specific criteria by which a court can judge a 
‘serious danger’ to the health of a mother, and which would make very clear 
and certain when an abortion is lawful.271 When that happens the criminal law 
in NSW will be able more effectively to discharge one of its purposes: to 
protect the lives of unborn children and prevent abortion on demand 
insidiously infiltrating society.272 
However, it is worth pointing out that the 2006 case of Dr Sood illustrates that 
NSW has not dropped its guard in the protection of unborn children and its 
criminal law retains some degree of potency.273 Dr Sood was found guilty in 
the NSW Supreme Court under section 83 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) for 
failing ‘to make the requisite inquiries in order to satisfy herself of the 
necessity to terminate the pregnancy’.274 At the time in question, Dr Sood had 
‘a history of malpractice and fraud complaints behind her’.275She was 
ultimately guilty of276 not looking into the grounds for the pregnant woman’s 
request for an abortion,277 even though the Court found that if Dr Sood had 
carried out the necessary inquiries, it would have been open for her to form 
the belief that a termination would be necessary in the circumstances.278 Dr 
Sood’s conviction generated a great deal of public attention,279 which served 
to publicise the need for doctors to diligently inquire into a request for an 
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abortion to ensure that such a procedure is carried out only in circumstances 
of necessity.280 The case also served to highlight that there is no abortion on 
demand in NSW and unborn children are protected under NSW law.281 
In light of the discussion on NSW, this article contends that the criminal law 
in that State does promote the right to life of unborn children, but its 
uncertainty with regard to what constitutes a ‘serious danger’ undermines its 
effectiveness. Nevertheless, NSW has demonstrated in its successful 
prosecution of Dr Sood that its abortion provisions under the Crimes Act282 
are potent and deserve respect.  
The disturbing facts in the Dr Sood case also demonstrate the real need for 
adequate protection for unborn children. The medication that Dr Sood 
provided to the pregnant woman to induce a late-term abortion induced her 
into labour and she delivered a baby at home in a toilet bowl.283 The woman 
and the baby were taken to hospital where — critical to the tragedy of this 
whole saga — medical staff observed signs of life in the baby; but because the 
child’s condition was inconsistent with survival, the medical staff made no 
attempt to resuscitate him.284 Poignantly, the Court grappled with the real 
issue of whether or not the child was born alive.285 What is certain is that 
these disturbing and tragic facts make it clear that abortions must be properly 
controlled through use of the principle of necessity. Effective criminal laws 
are needed to ensure that abortions not driven by necessity do not arise, or, 
when they do arise, they are properly dealt with by way of criminal 
prosecution.  
3 Queensland 
The law with regard to abortion in Queensland is in many respects similar to 
that of NSW.286 Therefore, this article will deal only with the salient aspects 
of Queensland’s abortion law.  
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The abortion provisions in Queensland are contained in the Criminal Code 
Act 1899 (Qld) and they proscribe abortions at any stage during the 
pregnancy.287 Section 224288 provides that ‘[a]ny person who, with intent to 
procure the miscarriage of a woman,… unlawfully administers to her … any 
poison … or uses any force of any kind’ is liable to 14 years imprisonment.289 
Section 225 provides that ‘[a]ny woman who, with intent to procure her own 
miscarriage,…unlawfully administers to herself any poison…or uses any 
force of any kind … or permits such thing or means to be administered or 
used to her’ is liable to seven years imprisonment.290 Section 226 provides 
that ‘[a]ny person who unlawfully supplies to or procures for any person 
anything whatsoever, knowing that it is intended to be unlawfully used to 
procure the miscarriage of a woman’ is liable to three years imprisonment.291 
In many respects, these provisions are similar to those in NSW and their 
interpretation is therefore influenced to a large extent by the same case law.292 
Whilst the aforementioned provisions create offences relating to unlawful 
abortions, section 282293 provides a statutory defence to doctors who carry out 
abortions via surgical operations or medical treatment, so long as the 
operation or treatment was conducted ‘in good faith and with reasonable care 
and skill … to preserve the mother’s life … [where such] … operation … or 
treatment [was] reasonable, having regard to … all the circumstances of the 
case’.294 Therefore, like NSW, Queensland punishes with criminal sanctions 
those who perform abortions; but, unlike NSW, Queensland provides a 
statutory defence for medical practitioners. However, this defence provision 
appears to be intended to expressly protect doctors in circumstances where a 
patient is unable to provide consent due to unconsciousness, and so forth.295 
Therefore, the case law determining circumstances in which abortions are 
deemed lawful and unlawful still applies in Queensland.296 
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The significant cases on abortion in Queensland centre on the legal question 
of what constitutes a ‘lawful abortion’.297 In K v T,298 the Court held that the 
principle of necessity as outlined in R v Davidson299 represents the law in 
Queensland with regard to when an abortion is lawful.300 This position was 
endorsed later in R v Bayliss and Cullen301 in which McGuire J stressed, 
whilst supporting the R v Davidson302 defence of necessity, that the defence is 
not available to excuse the termination of ‘every inconvenient conception’ and 
that only ‘in exceptional cases’ will abortions be deemed lawful.303 The point 
on which the law in Queensland possibly differs from that of NSW is the 
question of whether or not social and economic factors could be considered in 
assessing whether a serious danger to a pregnant woman’s health exists.304 It 
could be stated truly that R v Davidson305 certainly represents the law in 
Queensland and R v Wald306 probably represents the law in Queensland.307 
The effect of these decisions is that the availability of abortions in Queensland 
is more restricted than in NSW due in part to the uncertainty around whether 
or not R v Wald308 applies.309 
Another important case on what constitutes a ‘lawful abortion’ is Veivers v 
Connolly,310 which was a civil case. The critical aspect of this case, for the 
purpose of this article, is that the court came to a similar conclusion to the 
court in Superclinics311 — the conclusion that, in determining whether an 
abortion is lawful, any relevant danger to the mental health of the pregnant 
woman need not arise during the pregnancy, but could arise after the child’s 
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birth.312 However, only Kirby ACJ in Superclinics313 determined that the R v 
Wald314 test315 could be extended to the consideration of health effects on 
mothers after the birth of their children.316 The remaining uncertainty around 
whether or not social or economic factors play a part in determining the 
lawfulness of an abortion therefore continues to hamper access to abortion in 
Queensland.317 
Whilst the more restricted availability of abortion in Queensland318 is 
welcomed in the interests of safeguarding the lives of unborn children, there 
needs to be a properly balanced, certain and effective safeguard to ensure that 
the health of pregnant women is not unduly jeopardised simply because 
medical practitioners fear possible prosecution under the Queensland criminal 
jurisdiction.319 This article contends that, to fulfil this need, social and 
economic factors should certainly be taken into account when the impact that 
a pregnancy may have on the physical and mental health of a pregnant woman 
is being assessed. The current uncertainty around this area of the law in 
Queensland improperly causes the gate-keepers of abortion in Queensland —
the medical profession — to hesitate and even deny an abortion in 
circumstances where social and economic factors bear heavily on the health of 
a pregnant woman.320 Therefore, legislation should be passed to make certain 
the factors that could be considered in assessing the ‘serious danger’ to the 
health of pregnant women. Such legislation would instil confidence in 
medical practitioners in the decisions they make and safeguard them from 
criminal prosecution.321 
Notwithstanding the uncertainty around Queensland’s acceptance of R v 
Wald,322 the situation in Queensland is that in general terms its criminal law 
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serves to promote the right to life of unborn children. The law in Queensland 
remains a ‘guardian of the silent innocence of the unborn’ and uses its power 
to ensure that ‘abortion on whim or caprice does not insidiously filter into … 
society’.323 There is no abortion on demand in Queensland,324 and this 
position is reinforced by the recent prosecution of a Queensland couple for 
procuring their own abortion.325 
C Issues with Disparate Approaches by Jurisdictions 
to Criminal Statutes on Abortion 
This article illustrates that one Australian jurisdiction can be poles apart from 
another in the position it takes on abortion.326 Whilst there is no doubt that the 
jurisdictions which have a liberal attitude towards abortion fail to promote the 
right to life of unborn children, the issue that needs to be considered is how 
these liberal jurisdictions undermine the conservative jurisdictions’ efforts to 
protect the lives of unborn children through their respective criminal laws.  
The practical effect of the lack of uniformity in abortion laws across Australia 
is that one jurisdiction’s effort to protect the lives of unborn children is easily 
circumvented by pregnant women travelling to a liberal jurisdiction in search 
of an abortion.327 For example, residents of NSW and Queensland have ample 
time to travel to Victoria or the ACT for an abortion. This is because 99.3 
percent of abortions throughout Australia take place before 20 weeks 
gestation,328 and such abortions would be legal and a matter of a pregnant 
woman’s discretion in Victoria and the ACT.329 Unlike criminal offences such 
as murder, robbery, theft, deception, serious assault and rape, an abortion is 
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something that can be carefully considered, planned and, most critically, 
transferred to an accommodating liberal jurisdiction. It is extremely rare for a 
woman not to have an early notification of her pregnancy; in fact, whilst 
Superclinics330 illustrates a failure on the part of doctors to diagnose the 
plaintiff’s pregnancy until she was 19.5 weeks pregnant, she was very 
suspicious quite early on that she was expecting a child.331 All these factors 
conspire to allow individuals seeking abortions to ‘forum shop’ across 
jurisdictions to circumvent the practical effect of existing criminal laws 
proscribing abortion.332 
The availability of abortions at the discretion of pregnant women in liberal 
jurisdictions also serves to undermine the moral authority of the law in 
conservative jurisdictions. Of all the criminal prosecutions discussed, Dr 
Sood’s matter stands out as the only one returning a guilty verdict.333 But, 
even after acknowledging the ‘seriousness of the offences committed by … 
[Dr] Sood’,334 the Court nevertheless decided to impose a non-custodial 
sentence.335 To say this is not to criticise judicial decisions or prosecution 
outcomes; it is merely to highlight the fact that a prosecution may not result in 
a sentence with any meaningful deterrence value.  
Even when a prosecution is brought, the public outcry against the prosecution 
is almost deafening —as was the case in the recent prosecution against Leach 
and Brennan in Queensland.336 The arguments commonly used to criticise the 
legal position in the ‘pro-life’ jurisdictions generally involve highlighting the 
liberal position of the law in ‘pro-choice’ jurisdictions.337 It appears, 
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therefore, that the moral underpinning of abortion laws in jurisdictions such as 
NSW and Queensland is seriously undermined by the lack of uniformity in 
Australia’s abortion laws.338  
This article contends that there needs to be uniformity in Australia’s approach 
to abortion in order for the criminal law in conservative jurisdictions to 
effectively promote the right to life of unborn children. Forum shopping 
circumvents the laws controlling and restricting abortion and renders them 
ineffective, and ‘pro-choice’ jurisdictions undermine the moral authority of 
such laws.  
On this second point, a quote from Horace Rumpole in the fictitious work of 
John Mortimer serves in part to illustrate the matter: ‘You’re not concerned 
with the law, Members of the Jury … you are concerned with justice!’339 The 
temptation for juries to step outside their strict legal role of tribunals of fact is 
perhaps evident when we consider whether or not juries in abortion cases in 
pro-life jurisdictions are going to convict a person, and thereby possibly send 
that person to gaol, for doing what is allowed elsewhere. It is a valid question 
— one this article does not seek to answer, only to consider. What is certain is 
that there needs to be a concerted effort on the part of all Australian 
governments to establish a uniform approach promoting the right to life of 
unborn children — anything less will undoubtedly continue to sabotage the 
current efforts of pro-life jurisdictions.340 
D Public Policy on the Right to Life for Unborn 
Children 
In establishing the need for a uniform approach to abortion laws across 
Australia to protect the lives of unborn children, this article will now briefly 
put forth recommendations of public policy for consideration.  
Naturally, to achieve uniformity in abortion laws across Australia, it needs to 
be established what the Australian position is. Currently, there appears to be 
an avalanche of support for decriminalising abortion and making abortion a 
                                                 
338 See generally Rankin, ‘Contemporary Australian Abortion Law’, above n 105, 235; Dixon, 
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matter of personal choice for women.341 However, this article contends that 
the state must exercise its ‘responsibility as guardian of the silent innocence of 
the unborn’ and use its authority to prevent the occurrence of abortions on 
demand.342 The argument that women should be free to choose abortion is 
critically flawed when one considers that invoking this freedom results in the 
destruction of innocent life — at least the potential life of an unborn child.343 
With such a significant interest being put at risk through the legalisation of 
abortion on demand, a safeguard is necessary to ensure that abortions take 
place only as a matter of necessity.344 It is the contention of this article that 
this should be the Australian legal position. 
This article contends that the existing criminal law safeguards in pro-life 
jurisdictions such as NSW and Queensland could be improved to ensure legal 
certainty for all relevant stakeholders, namely medical staff and pregnant 
women. Legislation should spell out in the clearest terms possible the 
circumstances that necessitate an abortion and thus make it lawful. The issue 
of what clearly constitutes ‘serious danger’ should be addressed to ensure that 
it is not ‘open to subjective interpretation’ by the courts.345 The question of 
whether or not social and economic factors attributable to the pregnancy can 
be considered in determining whether any serious danger exists to the health 
of the mother should be put to rest; these factors should be considered, as they 
do on occasion play seriously on the mind of pregnant women, seriously 
undermining their health.346 With a uniform pro-life legal policy on abortion 
coupled with these improvements, Australian law can serve to protect the 
weakest in the community — unborn children347 — and safeguard their right 
to life, whilst giving due respect to the health concerns of pregnant women.348 
It should therefore be a matter of policy that abortions in Australia only take 
place as a matter of necessity.  
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V CONCLUSION 
It is the contention of this article that human life has an intrinsic value from 
the moment of its conception based on its potential use to the community.349 
This value to the community demands protection from the state in much the 
same way that any important public utility demands protection by the state. 
Whilst the ‘born alive’ principle in Australia is used to deny rights to an 
unborn child, it is merely a principle of convenient simplicity and legal 
fiction350 and is shown to be deficient when held up against the laws of other 
nations.351 These laws properly recognise that unborn children have a right to 
life and that such a right requires state protection.  
Whilst this article calls for the protection of unborn children, there is a need to 
balance this aim against the legitimate health interests of pregnant women. 
Abortions should be permitted only in circumstances where the abortion is 
necessary to preserve the pregnant woman from any serious danger to her 
physical or mental health. This should be a matter for medical practitioners352 
to determine, and social and economic factors — along with medical factors 
— should be taken into account when forming such determinations. What is 
certain, however, is that the potential value of human life should never be so 
underestimated that abortions on demand are permitted for frivolous reasons.  
This article has examined the law in two pro-choice jurisdictions — Victoria 
and the ACT — which have decriminalised abortion, making it possible for 
women to have abortions on demand. This position has been contrasted with 
that in the staunch pro-life jurisdictions, NSW and Queensland, where 
abortion remains a serious crime when undertaken for reasons other than 
necessity on maternal health grounds. Whilst the criminal law in NSW and 
Queensland has certain imperfections, which have been discussed in this 
article, the law in these jurisdictions nevertheless serves to promote the right 
to life of unborn children.  
Moreover, it is abundantly clear that without a uniform approach to the law of 
abortion, those jurisdictions with liberal abortion laws undermine the efforts 
of conservative jurisdictions to safeguard the lives of unborn children through 
the criminal law. Those women seeking an abortion can ‘forum shop’, 
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travelling to jurisdictions that permit abortions on demand. The existence of 
pro-choice laws in liberal jurisdictions also undermines the moral authority of 
the legal stance of conservative jurisdictions. All in all, this lack of a uniform 
approach in Australia to the protection of the right to life of unborn children 
sabotages existing safeguards put in place by pro-life jurisdictions.  
This article contends that there needs to be a uniform approach to the question 
of abortion in Australia. The criminal law needs to be improved to make clear 
to medical staff, pregnant women and members of the community that 
abortion is allowed only in circumstances of necessity and to provide certainty 
as to what constitutes such circumstances. For a few jurisdictions to adopt this 
approach on their own will be largely ineffective, leaving the most vulnerable, 
silent and defenceless in Australian society without legal protection. This 
should not be allowed to happen.   
 
